Global Private Investment in AI
Global Private Investment in AI
Experts expect global private AI investment to be lower in 2030 than in 2025 — $260B against $290B.
- Dec 31, 2024 — OWID has since revised 2024 upward. The panel was shown $130B when it answered; the series plots the current $131B figure.
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Our Analysis
How do we interpret these results
50% of experts believe that investment in 2030 will be between 196–400 billion USD, with 25% each on either side of this interval. The top decile believes that investment will be greater than 750 billion USD in the median scenario. Experts and superforecasts largely predict similarly, whereas the general public believes there will be substantially less global private investment in AI: 160 vs 200 billion USD in 2027, and 183 vs 260 billion USD in 2030.
Forecasts by group
Median forecasts from each group
| group | 2027 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|
| Experts | $200B | $260B |
| Superforecasters | $196B | $250B |
| Public | $159.5B | $183B |
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* Denotes non-overlapping bootstrapped confidence intervals between group aggregates.
Rationale analysis
The main lines of reasoning driving the spread in estimates
Trend extrapolation
Most high-forecast respondents extrapolate from historical trends showing over 30% compound annual growth from 2013-2024 and believe this momentum can continue. One argues, “$1T [trillion] is not very much compared to the total pool of investable assets.” Another notes that “the strong rebound to ~$130 billion in 2024 is critical. It occurred despite higher interest rates, signaling powerful, non-speculative belief in the transformative potential of generative AI.” But many low-forecast respondents worry about the AI bubble bursting, with one forecaster noting “both Deutsche Bank and Bain & Co. have just warned that the current AI boom is not sustainable,” (Edwards 2025) and another likening the current situation to “the dot com bubble in 2000.”
Enterprise adoption timelines
High-forecast respondents frequently note that “AI adoption is still in its early stages across many industries, suggesting there is substantial room for further expansion.” One forecaster quotes a 2025 McKinsey report: “Over the next three years, 92 percent of companies plan to increase their AI investments. But while nearly all companies are investing in AI, only 1 percent of leaders call their companies 'mature' on the deployment spectrum.” Some low-forecast respondents, however, argue that “the uptake for commercial purposes is still fairly slow,” and worry that productivity gains may not materialize quickly enough to justify high levels of investment. One noted, “Anthropic CEO's forecast of 90% of coding in the USA done by AI 'within six months' has been a fantastic dud” (Council on Foreign Relations 2025).
Economic downturn
Although rarely emphasized by high-forecast respondents, pessimists often stress macroeconomic risks, with one noting “The NBER [National Bureau of Economic Research] lists 14 recessions since (but not including) the Big One in 1929,” (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 2025) and from that calculates that “the chances of an economic contraction through 2027 and 2030 are 33% and 61% respectively, assuming a Poisson [i.e., random] process.”
Market evolution
High-forecast respondents tend to expect continued startup ecosystem growth, believing, “AI start ups & companies are staying in the private market for longer as it's much easier to get funding.” One notes that: Open AI has raised billions this year in the private market and that “these companies can also remain more agile to compete against a very fast changing market.” But some low-forecast respondents anticipate consolidation, with one arguing that “some leading companies will raise less private capital as they mature, merge, or turn to other funding sources.”
Investment sources
Some high-forecast respondents emphasize international expansion potential: “I suspect the number will be much higher than forecast as China's economy matures and begins to lift economies throughout the Asian region, including India. U.S. AI is just the tip of the iceberg.” Low-forecast respondents tend to express skepticism, with one noting that “investment is highly concentrated in the US,” and that “I don't expect the rest of the world to pick up the slack.”
Rationale examples
High-quality rationales from forecasters across the range
High-forecast respondents
If we assume constant linear growth, then investment should amount to $242 billion in 2027 and $355 billion in 2030. If growth is exponential, then we’re looking at quite a bit more: $360 billion in 2027 and $997 billion in 2030.
Goldman Sachs 2023 forecast for 2024 [1] appears to be spot-on (132B vs actual 130B), although they seem to have overestimated the 2023 amount (110B vs actual 93B). Their projection for 2025 was at 158B; they seem to use largely the same data & methodology with the Stanford AI Index Report, including the amounts expressed in constant 2021 US$. Based on this forecast, moderate projections suggest that global private investment in AI could surpass $250-300 billion by 2027 and could even approach $500-600 billion by 2030.
Low-forecast respondents
I'm not at all confident that current rates of investment in AI will stay the same, let alone continue to grow. Given that the U.S. is headed toward a major recession, and given the amount of money that companies like OpenAI are burning on rapidly expanding AI infrastructure without a clear sense of what future AI use cases will actually look like, I think we are in fact reaching the end of what is clearly a bubble.
My forecast reflects a shift in structure more than a shift in enthusiasm. Some leading companies will raise less private capital as they mature, merge, or turn to other funding sources. Others will drop out of the “AI” category altogether as their work gets folded into broader infrastructure or enterprise tooling. They will still be vital but no longer counted as “AI.” Additionally, some of the work that currently spins out as startups, especially around compliance, safety-testing, audits, and assurance, will likely move inward, absorbed by incumbents or coordinated through standards efforts. Meanwhile, policy environments may tighten, and potential infrastructure limits around energy and chip access could slow the pace of new deployments.