Members of Congress Discussing AGI Risk
Members of Congress Discussing AGI Risk
Experts expect 85 Democrats and 42 Republicans on the AGI-risk tracker by the end of 2026, against 72 members in total when the survey opened.
Bars show the median forecast for 2026.
Our Analysis
How do we interpret these results
At survey launch, the AIPN tracker listed 72 members of Congress: 46 Democrats, 2 independents who caucus with the Democrats, and 24 Republicans. All four groups expect the count to rise by December 31, 2026, and expect Democrats to keep outnumbering Republicans, but disagree on how large the rise will be. Experts give the highest median forecasts: 85 Democrats and 42 Republicans, 127 members in total, an increase of approximately 76%. AI risk experts' medians of 80 and 40 are slightly lower but statistically indistinguishable from experts', and the public's are 73 and 40. Superforecasters are the most conservative at 68 and 33, about 101 members in total, an increase of approximately 40%, significantly lower than both experts and AI risk experts.
Forecasts by group
Median forecasts from each group
| group | 2026 |
|---|---|
| Experts | 85 |
| Superforecasters | 68 |
| Public | 72.9 |
| AI Risk Experts | 80 |
Click any cell to compareTap any cell to compare
* Denotes non-overlapping bootstrapped confidence intervals between group aggregates.
Rationale analysis
The main lines of reasoning driving the spread in estimates
The chance of another shock
High-forecast respondents tend to give the occurrence of a new Hugging Face-like incident substantial weight: “Forecasters, and LLMs, are underrating the likelihood of large warning shots that change public sentiment.”; “If another major incident (misuse, accident, cybercrime/war) happens over the next 2 months I could see the topic and the discussion around it spike so that almost everyone has a public opinion / statement on it.” Many low-forecast respondents consider this angle, but deem it either unlikely to occur before December 31 or—if it does occur—unlikely to cause many more politicians to speak out. As one argues, “A shock the same size as September converts almost nobody new, because everyone with a threshold that low already spoke.”
The midterms
Respondents at both poles cite the November 3 election, with high-forecast respondents often arguing that the campaign will force members to take positions on AI. One writes that “the discussion is in the zeitgeist…there will probably be some show votes and hearings on the matter.” Low-forecast respondents more often expect other campaign issues to crowd the subject out: “Affordability, the Iran war and fuel prices will compete for attention.”; “AI ranked 11th out of 16 in issues that are 'very important' to voters.” One also notes “Congress is out until after the Nov 3 election, and the lame duck is short and crowded.”
AI progress
Some high-forecast respondents predict the rapid pace of AI progress will drive numbers higher: “I do expect the numbers to increase as AI capabilities continue to improve fairly dramatically in coming months, and we likely see more dramatic capability demonstrations and also alignment failures—especially as open source models near the Mythos-frontier become more capable.” Low-forecast respondents generally focus on the likelihood that talk of AI, when it occurs, will be more “about jobs, data centers, [and] electricity bills, which does not qualify.”
Reading September's surge
Many high-forecast respondents treat the 29 members added between September 9 and October 4 as the start of a trend that is likely to persist and “not a one-off.” Low-forecast respondents more often link the surge directly to Jacob Coxon's resignation and the Sanders–Casar bill, with several noting that the October 14 update added only a single name: “September was a burst, not a trend.”
Republican uptake
Most respondents expect Democrats to stay well ahead, with many arguing the issue allows Democrats to “stand in opposition to Trump.” Others point to the urban/rural divide: “Democrats in urban areas will appeal to their constituents with more specific topics of AI, while fewer Republicans will gain the same value doing the same in rural areas.” Another common sentiment is that, for Republicans, “if they criticize AI, they might run afoul of the president's position on AI and if they praise AI, they may be out of step with votes. Better to not raise it.” Those with higher Republican forecasts more often expect voter pressure, national-security issues, or the appeal of populist rhetoric to lead Republicans to speak out. Several also argue that “Trump's preference for the word 'superintelligence' may push some Republicans to be counted.”
Rationale examples
High-quality rationales from forecasters across the range
High-forecast respondents
Sometimes everything happens at once. This metric isn't close to saturating, since only a little over 13% of congress has spoken about this issue. I also personally know of several Republicans and Democrats whose offices privately reported that they are concerned about AI takeover, but who are working behind the scenes and haven't made a public statement about it yet. The increasing pace of AI progress combined with the increasingly dangerous capabilities that already exist are slowly building a new pressure wave which could dwarf the previous ones.
I'm hearing that policymaker-facing AI Safety folks are getting swamped with interest after hugging face and the Coxon resignation…I'm [also] hearing that Fable 5.5 and the next internal GPT model are frighteningly good, and will likely be out this year.
AIPN appears to require individual statements rather than counting co-signers, since 107 House Democrats signed the Liccardo/Lieu/Trahan AI-safeguards letter but only 46 Democrats are listed. Democrats (median +25): there's a large primed pool of likely additions. At least ~59 signers of that letter aren't on the tracker, and the Ban ASI Act keeps gaining cosponsors. Campaign messaging and a likely lame-duck fight over frontier AI legislation should keep the topic live.
I'm keeping relatively high 90% because of catastrophic outcomes. We are seeing more and more incidents but they are relatively benign in the sense that no one got actually hurt. It is possible that by EOY we see an event that makes AI risks very real to people.
Low-forecast respondents
A Republican representing a district with a substantial manufacturing or transportation workforce could spend six months talking about automation eliminating jobs, the economic consequences of increasingly capable AI systems, and the possibility of entire industries getting turned upside down, and still not qualify for this tracker because they never specifically discussed AGI, superintelligence, existential risk, or loss of control.
The self-selected members are already listed. The people most inclined to say 'superintelligence,' 'loss of control' or 'existential risk' have mostly done so.
I think the more likely angles for representatives' commentary on AI will not be around the hyperbolic, speculative, and divisive issues of AGI/ASI existential threats. Instead, more tangible and populist risk subjects—such as data centres, cyber security, and biological weapons—will likely dominate the A.I. risk talking points of most politicians' platforms, and they will likely actively avoid taking an ardent or clear position on AGI/ASI.
The tracker [updated] on October 14 and it moved from 72 to 73 --> one Republican and zero Democrats in ten days, right after the bill rollout. That's a pretty clear sign the launch spike is decaying faster than I'd assumed.