Forecasting Research Institute × LEAP

General AI Progress Scenarios

General AI Progress Scenarios

Experts expect about half the panel to call AI progress in 2030 'moderate', twice as many as expect it to be rapid.

Slow Progress
Moderate Progress
Rapid Progress

Our Analysis

How do we interpret these results

Experts, superforecasters and the public, all modally expect a “moderate” progress scenario. Most of the difference between these groups is in the weight they put on a “rapid” progress scenario, with superforecasters estimating 14%, experts 23%, and the public 26%. This is one of the few cases where the public expects faster progress than experts.

Forecasts by group

Median forecasts from each group

groupSlow ProgressModerate ProgressRapid Progress
Experts
28%
49%
22.96%
Superforecasters
37.23%
48.88%
13.89%
Public
29.34%
45%
26.26%

Click any cell to compare

Rationale analysis

The main lines of reasoning driving the spread in estimates

Scaling

Rapid-progress forecasters typically cite consistent capability improvements: “historically AI system development has followed a steep scaling curve and increases in model size-data and compute have led to rapid capability gains.” One points out that “METR [Model Evaluation and Threat Research] results imply a roughly 4 to 10x improvement in time horizon every year, which means that we'll have systems capable of doing weeks or months of work by the late 2020s.” Many rapid-progress forecasters also argue that AI progress has been consistently underestimated, and that “rapid progress is quite likely due to the [...] possibility of AI improving themselves.” Slow-progress forecasters often argue that current AI paradigms are likely insufficient: “For any of the moderate and rapid progress criteria to be met there would need to be a massive paradigm shift in AI technology. LLMs are unlikely to achieve these goals with the incremental progress made over the last 2-5 years.”

Physical world capabilities

Robotics is the strongest consensus limitation: “As a roboticist I have serious doubts about how quickly the embodied aspect of AI will make progress due to real-world implementation issues (sensors, communication delays, etc.) regardless of how good the brain is.” Many slow-progress forecasters also believe that historical precedent suggests caution is merited: “Having end to end task completion ability is hard as can be told from the development of autonomous vehicles (15+ years of R&D and 100+ billions of dollars invested and we are still scaling L4 robotaxis today).” Most moderate-progress forecasters also acknowledge this challenge.

Input constraints

Slow-progress forecasters often highlight the need for better training data, the cost of compute, and especially energy: “I expect energy to be the chief bottleneck to AI progress such that it will be a rate-limiter for progress in general.” Some forecasters expecting rapid progress, however, argue that such constraints can be eliminated by massive investment in AI, driven by corporate competition and national security incentives.

Reliability

A common consideration among slow-progress forecasters is that “[reliability] will be a difficult bar to clear for advanced-capability systems given current cognitive limitations.” They tend to emphasize that barriers like robust generalization, complex symbolic reasoning, and end-to-end safe autonomy for complex tasks will likely hold “superhuman across the board” scenarios back.

Rationale examples

High-quality rationales from forecasters across the range

Slow progress respondents

Radical change in major systems just takes longer than 4-5 years. I also think that [in] many of these domains, even unexpectedly fast advancement in AIs will not easily translate to improvements for quite some time because of unexpected barriers. That is, at least until we have strong artificial general intelligence (AGI), which we will not by 2030. To paraphrase an old saying, every job looks easy for those not actually doing it.

ChatGPT was first publicly released in late 2022. I don’t believe what we witnessed over these past 2.5 years would justify expecting rapid progress over the next 5.

We are in 2025 [at] peak AI hype. I do not expect this to last for another 5 years. The expectations will evolve.

Moderate progress respondents

If the METR task horizon trends hold, then by 2030 AIs would be able to do software tasks that take humans months or weeks. This kind of time horizon mostly seems like the moderate progress world.

Moderate sounds completely achievable even today with proper integration of the latest technologies (commercialized, announced, released & unreleased) of the SOTA labs into enterprise and consumer workflows. I’m less sure of the robot part.

Rapid progress respondents

The fast progress scenario essentially describes AGI, and my median timeline for that is 2030. This is mostly an intuitive guess. But I think the last three years of progress have been qualitatively immense, so the next five years seem like they could lead to highly autonomous systems capable of very impressive things. And the METR results imply a roughly 4 to 10x improvement in time horizon every year, which means that we'll have systems capable of doing weeks or months of work by the late 2020s.

I expect a roughly ~35% chance of AGI by EOY 2030. AGI is defined here as capable of automating all remote worker tasks (as of 2024 EOY) at a cost comparable to hiring a human of equivalent skill or better.

I predict AI development will follow the rapid progress scenario in most domains, with robotics being a notable exception where progress will likely align more closely with the moderate scenario. However, public perception will remain divided regardless of actual capabilities, because AI systems will continue to be imperfect—demonstrating remarkable proficiency in some tasks while exhibiting surprising blind spots in closely related areas. These inconsistencies will provide evidence to support conflicting viewpoints about AIs true capabilities.