U.S. Labor Force Participation Rate

Most stable-LFPR respondents argue AI will create ample new jobs even as old ones are destroyed: "Even if AI replaces some existing human tasks, I expect labor markets to reallocate rather than permanently shrink: people and firms will adapt by shifting work toward tasks where humans retain an advantage, and new roles and occupations will emerge." Many invoke prior technological revolutions as evidence that participation rates will hold, with one noting that massive declines "never happened in any of the previous GPT [general purpose technology] transformations (steam engine, electricity, combustion engine, computers, ICT [information and communications technology]) or in the recent 30 years of automation." Low-LFPR respondents tend to emphasize that AI is different: "Al is inherently an automating technology so prospects for maintaining high labor force employment are low. New jobs are inevitable but these can easily be supplemented and eventually replaced by Al and robotics."; "Even though AI may create some new types of jobs, [there will be] far fewer than the traditional jobs being replaced."

Both stable- and low-LFPR respondents cite an aging population as likely to put downward pressure on labor participation, but stable-LFPR respondents tend to emphasize it as a primary consideration: "I think two primary forces drive these estimates: demographics and AI displacement. Demographics dominates through 2030 regardless of [the] scenario, which is why my near-term numbers stay in a narrow band." Low-LFPR respondents, however, tend to emphasize this factor's potential to compound AI displacement: "Demographics alone will push participation down steadily as the 65+ share of the population grows from 18% now to over 21% by 2035 and keeps rising. With rapid AI progress, the decline accelerates."

Many stable-LFPR respondents argue that work fulfills psychological and social needs beyond income: "I expect lots of people to still work in 2050, even if their labor is not that important or useful. People just like working, and will invent reasons to pay each other for services." Some low-LFPR respondents argue otherwise: "Most people do not enjoy working, so rapid progress would allow most people to not have to work." One forecaster projects that by 2050 under rapid progress, only "about 1/4 people in the working-age population will chose to be employed…(for meaning, purpose, etc.)."

Stable-LFPR respondents often emphasize that rapid capability gains may not result in rapid adoption, especially when considering short timelines: "Labor markets are sticky and five years is not enough time for even rapid AI gains to fully reshape workforce composition." Low-LFPR respondents generally acknowledge near-term stickiness but argue 2050 is long enough for full disruption: "E.g., all the software engineering jobs we are currently worried are going away might actually go [away] gradually over next few decades."

Some stable-LFPR respondents note that displaced workers still count as participants if they seek work: "If AI displaces workers but they keep looking for jobs, participation stays the same (unemployment goes up instead)." But low-LFPR respondents generally argue that prolonged displacement is likely to produce discouraged workers who exit entirely: "Even in the short term…many white-collar jobs could disappear, leading a significant number of people to stop actively searching for work simply because those jobs no longer exist."

Both camps acknowledge public policy as a wild card, but disagree on its likely impact. Stable-LFPR respondents tend to think it more likely that intervention will sustain participation. "Governments have a strong incentive to keep labor participation high," writes one. Another adds, "I could imagine massive government jobs programs, or ways of keeping people 'busy and productive' even if it's a bit menial." Several low-LFPR respondents, however, argue UBI or an "expansion of 'social safety net' policies that discourage labor force participation" could have the opposite effect: "Policies such as UBI or 'tax the robots' would have to be in place for large percentages of the workforce to fully pull out of the workforce and thereby lower workforce participation rates substantively."

This distinction appears primarily among some low-LFPR respondents who argue AI-driven productivity gains may create wealth that makes work optional for many: "Society will also be richer, so I would expect more early retirements and other forms of reducing how much time the average individual spends in the labor force." Stable-LFPR respondents rarely engage with wealth effects directly, instead emphasizing that without redistribution mechanisms, most people will still need income from work: "Without a deep change in the economic paradigm, it is hard to imagine a world where only a small fraction of the population works..." One notes that "Baumol-like effects may make work more remunerative for difficult to automate jobs in the near-term, hence some possibility for growth."