Year NATO Authorizes Autonomous Cyber Weapons

The most significant difference of opinion among forecasters centers around whether a public or secret authorization would offer a greater strategic advantage. Late-resolution respondents frequently argue that nations will likely opt for secrecy, or at least ambiguity: “As we saw with the Iranian nuclear cyber attack [i.e., Stuxnet], explicit authorization for such systems wasn't a necessary prerequisite, and the challenges and liabilities (both legally and strategically) of implementing public-facing policies such as this far outweigh any potential benefits.”; “There is a real chance that strategic ambiguity is preserved indefinitely, with autonomy acknowledged implicitly but never explicitly authorized in binding public policy.” But many early-resolution respondents believe that “declaration of these capabilities [would] offer a credible deterrence signal.” One cites power imbalances as a potential factor, writing that “a country like Estonia, with low classic military capabilities but high cyber capabilities, that also sits on the Russian border, is more likely to try to use announced cyber plans as a deterrent.”

Many early-resolution respondents cite competitive pressure from adversarial states, such as “North Korea, China and Russia, who have already employed frontier technology for influence operations and infrastructure hacks,” as a likely driver of public authorization(s). One forecaster writes, “NATO member states are likely to adopt autonomous cyber operations or weapons when not doing so would appear to place it at a disadvantage relative to its enemies.” Late-resolution respondents typically don’t dispute this dynamic will play a role, but emphasize that maintaining parity or an advantage over adversaries in this domain does not require public authorization. As one writes, “I expect operational reality to significantly outpace formal law, with explicit public authorization lagging far behind real-world capabilities.”

Late-resolution respondents often point to legal and reputational hurdles Western democracies would face were they to attempt to publicly authorize such a policy. One argues that “'fully autonomous' and 'offensive' is a reputational third rail,” and another that “Western countries with checks and balances are unlikely to lead on this.” A third writes, “An important reason is the 'accountability gap' under International Humanitarian Law. Since autonomous systems can lack a predictable chain of command, NATO members face immense legal hurdles in ensuring these weapons comply with principles of distinction and proportionality.” Early-resolution respondents tend to focus on drivers that they believe will force nations to move past these legal hurdles. As one writes, “by 2050 the speed of cyber warfare will have definitively surpassed human reaction times, making 'human-in-the-loop' policies obsolete. States will pass laws authorizing autonomous 'counter-measures' (functionally offensive) to maintain deterrence.” Another argues that laws will adapt as the technology evolves: “I think that autonomous ‘judgments’ are going to become increasingly normalized going forward and that’s the tide that will drive saying it out loud.”

Several early-resolution respondents cite the political trajectory in the U.S. as having the potential to lead to a unilateral U.S. authorization. “In light of the U.S. disregard for norms in the current administration it is likely to change course on the current policy,” writes one, while another notes, “As we have seen from Trump’s first year in his second term[, he] is happy to publicly state many illegal things that he can, or has, done. But also claim he is allowed to do them. I can very easily see this apply to autonomous cyber weapons.” Many late-resolution respondents, however, cite the potential for the erosion of norms to instead lead to the dissolution of NATO—in which case, it would be impossible for NATO or any NATO member state to publicly authorize such a policy. One writes: “I think within a generation NATO as we know it now will not exist.”

Early-resolution respondents often emphasize that the technology is imminent or already present, and so the capability barrier isn’t a factor: “Autonomous cyber weapons are basically already possible, and maybe already being used (not only Stuxnet, but also that recent attack Anthropic reported on). So the question mainly comes down to when NATO will approve their use.” But late-resolution respondents are typically more focused on the risks of autonomy given the current state of AI. They argue that “solving the hallucination problem is a requirement” and that “while the technology may be technically viable now or in the near future, implementing such a policy into law would create immense pressure, especially considering the potential for a skilled hacker to alter algorithms and trigger catastrophic consequences.”