Probability of a U.S.–China Military AI Pact

Forecasters frequently point to the current U.S. presidential administration as an obstacle to an agreement being signed. “This is quite unlikely during the Trump administration,” writes one, while another notes “the current U.S. 'AI Action Plan' (July 2025) explicitly pivots away from guardrails toward ‘winning the race.’” But many forecasters, although inclined to view an agreement as “unlikely in the current political environment,” view one as “highly likely in the next one”; “I expect no change in posture towards China or military AI in the remainder of the Trump administration, but suspect that the first two years of the next administration (e.g., by the 2030 date) is a potential inflection point.”

Many late-resolution respondents emphasize that “in the short term, while both sides are racing to build the ‘best’ AI, I don't see either wanting to constrain itself in writing,” and stress that “AI is viewed as central to future military dominance,” especially given “Taiwan tensions, where [an] AI advantage is decisive.” One writes that “if one side is widely believed to be compounding an advantage, a signed agreement reads less like mutual risk reduction and more like a constraint on the leader’s options.” Another argued that “both sides view military AI as a core competitive advantage,” and therefore, “agreeing to constraints would be perceived domestically as conceding future battlefield advantage.” Several early-resolution respondents acknowledge this dynamic, but come to a different conclusion regarding its effect. One argues “China's technology capacity will eventually outstrip the U.S. in scale and scope, forcing the U.S. to come to the table,” and many point to the shared danger of escalation independent of human control, or a near-miss incident related to the military use of AI, as the potential basis of an agreement: “The deployment of AI-enhanced and autonomous weapons systems by nation-states, actual or fears of escalation around Taiwan, and a high-profile AI near-miss incident will drive cooperation between the two powers.”

Several late-resolution respondents stress that the intangible, dual-use nature of AI will make it hard to verify if an agreement is being violated: “Military AI systems are software-driven, dual-use, and easily repurposed. Neither country would accept inspection or transparency mechanisms capable of meaningfully verifying compliance, and without verification a formal treaty is politically infeasible.” Another echoed that point, writing “it is not obvious how an agreement like this would be verified,” in contrast to Cold War nuclear agreements that were validated via “physical inspections, plane and satellite surveillance.” Early-resolution respondents tend not to address the verification factor, or suggest that an agreement could be symbolic or intended to establish voluntary norms for responsible use rather than technically restrictive, with one noting that that “confidence-building measures...are not necessarily legally binding.”

Many late-resolution respondents point to the breakdown in trust between the U.S. and China as a major barrier. This forecaster summed up the consensus well: “The current U.S. government has been quite open in saying that any agreement that any U.S. government (including the current U.S. government) agreed [to] in the past will be set aside if/when it is convenient to do so. This doctrine applies to friends and allies (e.g. member[s] of NATO) so China would be extremely naive if it expected the U.S. to keep to any agreement that limited both sides ability to do something that might give it an advantage…I also doubt that many in the U.S.A. would trust China to keep any agreement on the military use of AI.” Early-resolution respondents acknowledge what one characterized as “a historic low in the U.S.-China relationship,” but tend to weigh other drivers more heavily.

Several early-resolution respondents point to prior agreements between adversaries: “There is a long precedent of competing major powers signing key international agreements around arms control and non-proliferation (like the U.S. and the USSR signing the START I [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty], INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces], CTBT [Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban] and other treaties),” writes one. Others note that in 2024, Biden and Xi agreed that nuclear launch decisions should be left in exclusively human hands, suggesting a nuclear AI agreement of this nature that met the question resolution criteria could come to fruition. Some late-resolution respondents take issue with the nuclear analogy, however, with one writing “it’s not clear that the use of AI in warfare actually inherently produces the type of catastrophic risk that nuclear weapons do…AI can be used in non-lethal warfare, for instance.”

Early-resolution respondents typically view the bar for a signed agreement as easily surmountable, emphasizing that the “question language sets a low bar for resolution by allowing for a restricted, targeted agreement,” such as a limited Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Some suggest a “reaffirmation of the Biden-Xi AI-nuclear redline” statement could evolve into a qualifying agreement. Several late-resolution respondents instead highlight the caveat that any “agreement might be multilateral” which could obviate the need for a bilateral agreement.