Share of U.S. Electricity Used for AI
Share of U.S. Electricity Used for AI
Experts expect AI to use 12% of U.S. electricity by 2040 — twelve times its share in 2024.
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Our Analysis
How do we interpret these results
The median expert predicts that 4% of U.S. electricity consumption will be used for training and deploying AI systems in 2027. That rises to 7% of all electricity consumption in 2030, and close to double that (12%) in 2040. For context: 7% is 1.5x today’s entire data-center load, and 12% is close to all of Texas’ electricity use. The top quartile of experts predict that AI training and deployment will account for more than 20% of total U.S. electricity consumption by 2040, and the top 10% believe it will account for more than 30%. 20% is almost all of the industrial sector’s electricity use. Experts and the public predict similarly across all dates, while superforecasters are slightly less optimistic—predicting 3%, 6%, and 10%.
Forecasts by group
Median forecasts from each group
| group | 2027 | 2030 | 2040 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Experts | 4% | 7.4% | 12% |
| Superforecasters | 3% | 5.7% | 9.8% |
| Public | 5% | 8% | 14% |
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* Denotes non-overlapping bootstrapped confidence intervals between group aggregates.
Rationale analysis
The main lines of reasoning driving the spread in estimates
Infrastructure
Many high-forecast respondents emphasize that tech companies are making unprecedented capital commitments to AI infrastructure: “With the building of data centers and dramatic investments in large-scale infrastructure, such as Project Stargate, alongside policies and executive orders enabling the leasing of federal land for more AI data centers…I absolutely think electricity consumption for AI in the near term will skyrocket.” Others point to the possibility that competition between companies and nations for supremacy in AI may lead to “an explosion in energy usage.” Low-forecast respondents tend to focus more on potentially formidable constraints, particularly when considering “the material and political investments necessary to get significant growth—physical data centers, chips, permitting, water for cooling, transmission lines, etc.”
Projections
Many forecasters anchor on institutional projections: “The Boston Consulting Group says 7.5% in 2030 [for data centers]. Bloomberg says 8.6% [for data centers] by 2035…AI-specialized servers accounted for 15% of total global data center demand in 2024. Electricity usage by specialized AI hardware accounted for 11-20% in 2024. Demand implies that a share of AI-related U.S. data center electricity consumption of 50/180=27.8%.”
Efficiency gains
A common low-forecaster consideration was that “there is a huge amount of scope for efficiency gains [and] things will become more efficient as they scale up,” and several noted that “DeepSeek appears to consume considerably less power” than frontier U.S. models. High-forecast respondents, however, largely don’t believe efficiency improvements will meaningfully reduce overall consumption: “More efficient chips and algorithms will simply lead to more compute going into training and inference.” One argues, “Jevons paradox will surprise on the upside - i.e., even more efficient chips will mean more usage with little savings in terms of energy efficiency.”
AI bubble
Many low-forecast respondents emphasize business model concerns: “The current economics of all of this are obviously not sustainable: we're spending billions of dollars on these data centers in support of AI companies, or AI segments of hyperscalers, that are losing huge amounts of money off their core AI businesses.” Multiple forecasters note “AI will need to begin demonstrating economic and social utility rapidly to justify the investments in physical infrastructure necessary to sustain rapid growth in energy consumption.”
Geopolitical competition
Some high-forecast respondents emphasize that “China is also investing massive amounts in datacenters,” with one writing “there's a chance that we enter an arms race that is mostly determined by who can pump the most electricity into AI.” A low-forecast respondent suggests this dynamic, instead of resulting in U.S. growth, could drive infrastructure offshore: “Major developers will possibly respond by increasingly outsourcing the physical infrastructure of data processing to locales outside of the US—there's no particular reason why models need to be trained inside of U.S. borders where the economic and political expenses are potentially much higher.”
Scaling plateau
High-forecast respondents typically expect continued returns from scaling: “I think it's more likely than not that transformative superintelligence will have arrived by 2040, in which case almost all knowledge work …will be reliant on the use of AI models.” Whereas low-growth forecasters commonly express that they anticipate diminishing returns: “Unless further scaling leads to qualitative leaps in AI capabilities, the growth in electricity consumption for AI training and deployment is unlikely to be exceptionally rapid;” “We have already seen indications that the limits of scaling may be soon reached.”
Denominator effects
Rarely emphasized by high-forecasters, low-forecast respondents frequently pointed out that “while growth in power production will likely be necessary for much growth in AI systems, overall power consumption is the denominator in this calculation, and increased demand from electric vehicles could play a role in growing this denominator” and therefore “data centers' energy consumption will grow in absolute terms, but not so much in relative terms.”
Rationale examples
High-quality rationales from forecasters across the range
High-forecast respondents
... the exponential scaling of AI model training, the deployment of increasingly powerful systems across all industries, and the emergence of autonomous AI agents that run continuously. This explosive growth trajectory reflects AI becoming as fundamental to the digital economy as the internet itself.
Given the likely lack of regulation related to AI-energy consumption in the next several years…and the race to the bottom between AI companies and nation states to deploy these systems, I think we are likely to see an explosion in energy usage related to this technology.
The U.S. Department of Energy is seriously considering the possibility of allowing companies with large data centers dedicated to training AI models to install a small nuclear power plant nearby that would be able to meet their energy needs. This strategy would also reinforce the U.S. commitment to energy sources that do not emit greenhouse gases. The most solid option right now, both from a technical and economic perspective, are compact modular reactors known as SMRs (Small Modular Reactors).
Low-forecast respondents
I’m still seeing this as a period of build-up: we’ll see major investment in new data centers and specialized AI hardware, but constraints like power availability, construction timelines, and chip supply will keep growth modest.
Major developers will possibly respond by increasingly outsourcing the physical infrastructure of data processing to locales outside of the US—there’s no particular reason why models need to be trained inside of U.S. borders where the economic and political expenses are potentially much higher.