OpenAI and Anthropic Revenue Run-Rate
OpenAI and Anthropic Revenue Run-Rate
Experts expect OpenAI and Anthropic's combined run-rate to reach $175B by the end of 2026 and $523B by 2030.
Hover to highlight a group, click to show or hide itTap a group to show or hide it
Our Analysis
How do we interpret these results
All groups expect continued rapid growth, broadly agreeing on the annualized revenue run-rate by the end of 2026 but diverging for 2030. For 2026, experts, superforecasters and AI risk experts all give a median of $175 billion and are statistically indistinguishable, while the public is significantly lower at $160 billion. For 2030, superforecasters give $700 billion and AI risk experts $680 billion, with the AI risk experts' median significantly higher than experts' at $523 billion (the superforecasters' difference is not significant). The public is significantly lower than every other group at $275 billion. Uncertainty widens sharply for 2030, with AI risk experts the most uncertain group: their median 10th and 90th percentile forecasts span $250 billion to $1.6 trillion.
Forecasts by group
Median forecasts from each group
| group | 2026 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|
| Experts | $174.7B | $523B |
| Superforecasters | $175B | $700B |
| Public | $160B | $275B |
| AI Risk Experts | $175B | $680B |
Click any cell to compareTap any cell to compare
* Denotes non-overlapping bootstrapped confidence intervals between group aggregates.
Rationale analysis
The main lines of reasoning driving the spread in estimates
Whether hypergrowth slows
Most respondents expect growth will slow but disagree on how quickly. High-revenue respondents predict it will remain strong through 2030: “Combined AI company revenues have been growing at something like 700% over the last year. Even if the doubling time of AI revenues slows dramatically, revenues north of 2T by EOY 2030 seem very plausible.”; “Current adoption may represent only an early stage of a much broader transformation.”; “I expect substantial growth driven by broader AI adoption and expansion into new business areas, such as Anthropic exploring vaccine development.” Low-revenue respondents more often expect growth to fall toward rates seen at other large tech firms: “The recent growth is crazy…but this cannot be sustained. Comparison classes such as Google, Facebook, Amazon suggest 20-25% annual growth.”
Competition
Low-revenue respondents often cite rapidly improving open-weight and Chinese models, along with proprietary-model competitors, as threats: “Not every employee needs a frontier reasoning model.”; “Other options certainly include Gemini and Grok. More importantly [the competition] includes open source models with their cheaper implementations. For most applications, the cheaper model will suffice.” High-revenue respondents tend to expect buyers to keep paying for the best: “For a lot of things you really do want to pay for the best possible performer (that's precisely why salaries are very high in talent-constrained areas).”; “On revenue, I believe in substitution of human labor rather than commoditization: companies won't pay for AI like software, but like labor, in a market measured in trillions of dollars of wages.”
The disputed baseline
Many respondents note that the $135 billion baseline shifted mid-survey, when OpenAI's September run rate was reported at about $50 billion on its own accounting basis. Low-revenue respondents often start from roughly $115 billion and stress that the figure that resolves the question may be weeks old: “Resolution uses the latest figure reported by Dec 31, not the actual December number.” High-revenue respondents tend to build from year-end targets of about $70 billion for OpenAI and $100–120 billion for Anthropic, and emphasize a record of underestimates: “I deliberately put the median above trend-skeptic anchors given the history of under-forecasting here.”
Transformative AI
A few high-revenue respondents tie their highest scenarios to recursive self-improvement and an “intelligence explosion,” after which the labs could “dominate a huge fraction of industries and economic activity.” Low-revenue respondents more often raise the political response such growth could provoke: “I fear continued exponential growth will lead to a backlash against AI due to automation of work.”; “It seems unlikely that an AI company with substantially >$1.5tn revenue would be stable for long in a democratic country.”
Rationale examples
High-quality rationales from forecasters across the range
High-revenue
For the end of 2026, my median estimate of $175 billion reflects continued enterprise adoption, growing API consumption, and increasingly capable agentic products that are beginning to perform useful economic work rather than merely assisting humans with isolated questions. I'm seeing this transition directly in my own engineering work, where the interesting applications are increasingly systems that perform substantial bounded tasks, maintain context across extended workflows, interact with external services, and produce artifacts that would otherwise require meaningful human effort. I think the economic value proposition becomes considerably more compelling when AI moves from summarizing a document to independently implementing a feature or investigating a production issue, provided that the resulting work can actually be trusted.
Taking into account that AI seems more and more important in most of the things I do every day (I use it both for research in physics as well as forecasting), I think that the [2030] median [I offered in Wave 11] should be higher. I will revise it to 1300…Amazon was given as an illustrative example in the question, and it was close to 1 trillion, while Google is about half a trillion. It is not insane to assume that both OAI and Anthropic would have ARRs of the same order of magnitude by the end of 2030, or even considerably much higher.
White collar global share of GDP is like 25T today. After AI-led growth in the sector, it will be higher. I don't think it's unreasonable to think that, in 2030, the labs will have quintupled their current revenue, capturing a mere 4% of white collar share of GDP. Indeed, it could be higher, but competition, consumer surplus, etc. will prevent all of the gains from going to the big labs.
Low-revenue
2030 is way in the future. 10th percentile is a pretty normal world, so these companies probably top out at 'giant megacorp' and the sigmoids stop…
History is full of enormously consequential technologies whose inventors and early commercial leaders did not ultimately capture anything approaching the total value they created, and I see no particular reason to assume that frontier AI will be exempt from competitive economics simply because its products are exceptionally impressive. Ultimately, I'm very bullish on the utility of the technology, moderately bullish on these particular businesses maintaining substantial revenue growth, and considerably less confident that today's extraordinary revenue trajectories can continue indefinitely without running into the usual inconvenient realities of competition, pricing, margins, and customers who would prefer not to spend their entire operating budget asking a computer to think about stuff and things.
Through to 2030 there will be power constraints, demands for all this spend to be showing a return (which it is not currently doing) and competition between the two companies and with open-source models may mean that they either cut prices a lot or one wins and the other withers so forecasting growth for both may be optimistic.